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The Katyń massacre is one of the biggest tragedies that the Poles had to suffer in the 20st 
century, and therefore it is still alive in the common memory of the Polish society: not only as 
a faded away family story, and not even only as a part of history that is only important for 
historians or politicians, but as a "coexisting" symbol as well. If we only look at the death toll 
of this massacre, this tragic event could not have played such a leading role in Polish history, 
since much more people became victims of deportation to the Soviet Union, German war 
crimes, or the war itself. In the light of the above the question is simple: how and why Katyń 
became a symbol, why does it mean today much more than a simple "sad event" from the 
past? It is widespreadly known, that the topic is still playing an important role in today's 
Poland. But it was a very long and hard way to get to the current conditions, when the topic is 
free to talk about and free to research. And thank to this long lasting struggle, not only the 
world became aware of the tragedy, but the whole issue regained such a great importance 
inside of Poland as well. The basic aim of the dissertation is to unfold the history of the 
struggle that took place between the Polish people and various political interests of 
superpowers that tried to conquer Poland, the struggle that's main goal was to be able to speak 
about the Katyń massacre as it was, and not according to the expectations of the German, 
Soviet and Western propaganda. Katyń namely played the role of a good instrument of 
propaganda for almost fifty years - the powers that tried to dominate Poland used it along 
their actual political interests without trying to reveal the truth. However it is very important 
to mention, that the history of the struggle against the Katyń lie is not only important from a 
Polish point of view, but it is also crucial that Katyń, the massacre that became a symbol for 
Polish freedom fight and martyrdom for independence, was well known in Hungary as well - 
mainly because of its Hungarian aspects. It's enough to mention a couple of them to underline 
the importance of Katyń in the Hungarian public opinion: the Hungarian commissioner for 
refugees, József Antall (sr.) offered a helping hand to the Polish organizations to find the 
"missing" (and already in fact dead) officers in the Hungarian refugee camps; the news of the 
massacre caused a major outrage amongst the Polish refugees in Hungary; at least one 
Hungarian man fell victim to the Katyń killings; the Hungarian news dealt with the issue in 
details; the main evidence to the Soviet Union's guilt was provided by a Hungarian 
pathologist in 1943 (dr. Ferenc Orsós) and the Katyń massacre remained important for the 
Hungarian opposition after the war as well. According to the above list it is clear, why the 
horrors of Katyń had a huge influence on the Hungarian public opinion and this is already a 
good reason to examine not only the Polish, but the Hungarian echoes of the Katyń massacre 
as well. 
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1. Aims of the dissertation 
 
As we mentioned before, we will try to examine both the Polish and the Hungarian echoes of 
the Katyń massacre, and we will do it mainly via using the methods of reception history and 
history of effects - so most of all exploring how the above mentioned topic appeared in both 
countries, in the public opinion, in the official communications and in the press. By doing that 
we will clarify what kind of effects did this have on politics, common opinion and how it 
helped (or hindered) the clarification of the Katyń case, how it became some kind of symbol, 
and how it influenced the Hungarian public opinion. So to sum it up, the main goal of the 
dissertation is to describe the history of the Polish and Hungarian reception of the Katyń 
massacre in details - both in Poland and in Hungary, and both under and after the war, until 
the fall of communism. 
As it immediately turns out from the above list, the topic is so far-reaching and diverse in time 
and complexity as well, that we need to set up some limits, a "framework" for our work, just 
to avoid the disseration being over-long and diffuse. That is why this work does not (or rather 
only shortly does) expound neither the clashes and compliactions in the international politics 
caused by the massacre, nor the changes of the international public opinion and the world 
press (the Western "echo"), and not even the history and historiography of the incredible 
publication-wawe after 1989. Sticking to this lastly mentioned timeframe is especially 
important, because the actual evolution of the case happened between the appearance of the 
first news in 1943 and between 1989. However the story of Katyń is still not ended, it is only 
the "era of the Katyń-lie", that got to an end in 1989. From this time on the archival sources 
became freely accessible and the history of the researches and the new publication-wawe that 
had been triggered by this fact could form the basis of another monography. It is very 
important to underline, that the whole topic is still almost too large to handle, even if we stick 
to the above mentioned timeframe - so if we would like to examine the echoes of Katyń 
between 1943 and 1989, the size of our work still could easily reach 1000 pages. The Polish 
and Hungarian public opinon was only two of the media, that had been affected by the topic. 
Even though (due to the Polish-Hungarian orientation of our work) we have to mostly ignore 
the full history of the echoes of the topic in other countries, in the Western public opinon, in 
some cases it is in fact neccessary to mention the different opinons of the superpowers that 
had been involved in the Katyń case. So we will add German, Soviet and "Western" opinons 
(even from the Polish and Hungarian emigration) to the Polish-Hungarian "spaceframe", just 
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to show how these influenced, affected each other. But it is also important to mention, that we 
will do this only until it is really neccessary for the clarification of the effects of propaganda 
and foreign news regarding the two countries. 
We will examine the topic from many aspects, from the viewpoint of politics (how it affected 
the memory of Katyń), from the viewpoint of the society (what was the people's relation to 
the propaganda, how they could build and express their own opinon), and from the viewpoint 
of the history as a science (how historians releated to the tragedy, how could they express 
their own opinion). 
 
2. Sources, bibliograpy and the methods of the research 
 
As the case in Poland and in Hungary too was used by the propaganda of superpowers (with 
different motives of course) just until 1989, we will pay a great attention to the official, 
"mainstream" press and media. We will add to this the reactions of the public opinion, that 
could be measured by looking at various publications (released by underground press or the 
emigration) or by examining the archival documents of state security services in both 
countries. So we will use the sources of the contemporary official and unofficial press, 
archives of state security services and even sources of contemporary literature (works of both 
publicists, writers and historians as well). This lately mentioned part is not only significant 
because it shows us the limits that had been set up by the censorship, but it also guides us 
through the historiograpy of the topic as well. In order to not make our dissertation to a dry 
analysis of contemporary censorship and press, we will use other sources of public memory as 
well, like memoirs, diaries, recollections. These, beyond that they make the picture about the 
effects, echo of the massacre more "colorful", will also help us to understand what Katyń 
meant for the inviduals, between what limits could they speak about the topic. So basically it 
will show us a picture according to the narrative of "history from the bottom up" , that is 
serving as a basic element of reception historical researches. 
To present the above in details, we will use various sources: in addition to documents 
accessible in libraries, archives and musems (for example Biblioteka Jagiellońska and 
Muzeum Armii Krajowej in Cracow, Muzeum Katyńskie in Warsaw), document collections 
released after 1989 provide a great help as well. The topic of Katyń in Poland literally has 
such a big amount of works realesed in the past decades that could easily fill a library and that 
could answer almost all of our questions. Just to mention the latest year's releases we can 
name quite lot of work about the topic, like for example "Katyń. Zbrodnia, prawda, pamięć" 
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(Katyń. Massacre, Turth, Memory) by Andrzej Przewoźnik (2010), "Katyń. Zbrodnia i 
kłamstwo" (Katyń. Massacre and Lie) by Tadeusz A. Kisielewski (2010), "Mord Katyński. 
Siedemdziesiąt lat drogi do prawdy" (The Katyń Massacre. A Seventy Years Way to the 
Truth) by Wojciech Materski (2010). As it already might turned out from the above titles, the 
majority of the listed works mentions the reception historic aspect of the topic, but rather from 
the viewpoint of the superpowers, so from the usually as "only important" treated postions. 
Especially from this angle presents the story Franz Kadell, ("Katyń w oczach zachodu" - 
Katyń the Eyes of the West, 2010), Eugenia Maresch ("Katyń 1940"), and Anna 
Dzienkiewicz too ("Rosja a Katyń" - Russia and Katyń). 
However the modern Polish literature is dealing with Katyń and its echoes, reception-history 
in details, only rather few of the authors mention the Hungarian aspects of Katyń, and who 
does, does it only very shortly. No wonder that we should turn to the Hungarian literature if 
we want to learn more about the Hungarian aspects of the massacre. The most important 
Hungarian works about the topic are the following ones: "Csoda a Visztulánál és a Balti-
tengernél. Piłsudski... Katyń... Szolidaritás" (Miracle on the Vistula and at the Baltic Sea. 
Piłsudski... Katyń... Solidarity) by Istán Kovács (2010), "Katyń, 1940 Lengyelország a 
Szovjetunió és Németország "életterében" (1914–1945)" (Katyń, 1940 Poland in the "living 
space" of the Soviet Union and Germany (1914-1945)) by István Németh (2013),  and "Az én 
Katyńom - Mój Katyń" (My Katyń - Mój Katyń) by Konrad Sutarski. It is also important to 
underline the work of Károly Kapronczay, who was the first after the fall of communism to 
carry out deeper researches in the topic of the Hungarian aspects of Katyń. His most 
important works in this field are: "Katyń magyar vonatkozásai" (Hungarian aspects of Katyń - 
published in "Élet és tudomány", in 1990) and "Katyń és Magyarország" (Katyń and Hungary 
- published in "Tekintet", in 1991). Besides all these, Kapronczay as a medical historian 
revealed the role of prof. Ferenc Orsós as well. The Hungarian aspects of the massacre were 
published in some other studies as well, such as "Magyarok és Katyń" (Hungarians and Katyń 
- written by the former Hungarian ambassador in Poland, Ákos Engelmayer), "Katyń magyar 
áldozata" (The Hungarian Victim of Katyń - a work about Emánuel Korompay, written by 
Konrád Mattheidesz in 2004) and "Orsós-ügy" avagy a tudós felelőssége" (The Orsós-Case 
and the Responsibility of a Scientist - by Szilveszter Vizi E., 1994). As it turns out from the 
above listing, the authors who wrote about the Hungarian aspects of the topic mainly focused 
on two subjects: the role of Ferenc Orsós and Emánuel Korompay, and they only slightly 
touch other parts of the story, like for example its relations to the Hungarian public opinion. 
Besides the fact that there are quite a lot of inaccuracies in the early publications, for example 
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regarding the role of Ferenc Orsós, the above listed works mainly does not even mention (or 
just shorty mention) the Hungarian reception history of Katyń and the appearance of the topic 
in the contemporary press and how it influenced the public opinion. Quite a little is said about 
the relations between the Hungarian and Polish reception of the topic, and about the 
differences between the propaganda carried out in the two countries about the case. It is worth 
to mention that instead of the Polish literature most of the Hungarian works does not pay 
attention neither to the postwar reception history of the massacre, nor to the influence of the 
efforts of Polish underground movements on the Hungarian public opinion. This present 
dissertation will try to provide a full view of the Polish and Hungarian echoes, reception 
history and memory of the Katyń massacre - not only for the war era, but until the fall of 
communism, when the topic of Katyń became free to research and talk about.  
 
3. The theses of the dissertation and the results of the research 
 
So the main goal of the dissertation is to get a full view of the Polish and Hungarian reception 
history and memory of the Katyń massacre between 1943 and 1989. To achieve this, we 
examined in details how the topic appeared in both countries in the official communications, 
in the press, and how this all influenced the public opinion and politics, how this helped (or 
hindered) the clarification of the case, what made it turn to some kind of a symbol, and how 
this Polish tragedy affected the Hungarian public opinon. We researced the topic inbetween 
the "timeframe" of the era of the "Katyń lie", so until the admission of the Soviet Union's 
guilt, and of course keeping in mind the "spaceframe" required by the Polish-Hungarian 
reception history of the topic. 
1. After we became familiar with the prequels and the history of the massacre itself, and 
shortly with its Hungarian aspects (including the role of Ferenc Orsós), as the first big chapter 
of our study we we began our work with the Polish wartime recetipon history of the massacre. 
We went through this part mainly focusing on three main aspects - the goals of the 
propaganda, the way how the topic appeared in front of the public opinion, and the effects it 
triggered. To put it in a nutshell, we were looking for answers to the question, how the case 
appeared in the German and Soviet propaganda in Poland and what kind of reactions did it 
spark in the Polish society. As a result of our investigation we can definitely say, that the one 
and only significant result of the propaganda-campaign lead by Goebbels regarding Katyń 
was the breakdown of the Polish-Soviet relations, as Germans could not persuade neither the 
international, nor the Polish public opinion about their truth, and they also failed in glossing 
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their own war crimes over by mentioning only the Katyń case. As Marian Kukiel, Polish 
ambassador remarked: "the standpoint of the Poles has not been changed, because the faults 
of the German politics rooted too deeply. The Katyń case gave nothing for the Germans, 
neither a Quisling, nor soldiers, workers, and the underground actions did not rarefied as 
well."
1
 In general we can say that neither the German, not the Soviet propaganda could not 
achieve to gather supporters and establish their own credibility. Only the press and 
propaganda of the Home Army and other patriotic resistant organisations remained acceptable 
for the majority of the Polish people, and the communist underground organisations seriously 
compromised themselves in the eyes of the Polish public opinion and the above mentioned 
other organisations by standing up for the Soviet opinion. So it clearly can be stated, that as 
the result of the "propaganda-war" in Poland regarding the Katyń case, there were no 
"winners": neither its initiator, the propaganda-machine of Goebbels, nor the "accused" of the 
case, the Soviet Union could reach almost nothing and got in a losing position in the eyes of 
the Polish public opinion. 
2. We will examine the wartime Hungarian reception history of the topic using similar 
questions and similar methods, but assuming that Katyń in the contemporary Hungarian press 
and in the eyes of the Hungarian public opinion was nothing more than actual news, a horrific 
story, that however got quickly blurred by other news of the world war. We will find out what 
effects the German propaganda had on Hungarians, and besides that we will mention as well, 
how it influenced the Polish refugees living in Hungary. We investigated the credibility of the 
German claims and the Katyń news via examining the role and credibility of Ferenc Orsós in 
detail. According to the sources used we can come to the conclusion, that the Hungarian 
public opinion (just like the Polish people as well) treated the case as a Soviet crime. However 
it is important to mention that compared to Poland, German propaganda could achieve a bit 
more in Hungary, even if it was not based on sympathy, but plain fear. The official press, the 
officially present opposition (and anti-Nazi) newspapers, the foreign radio communications, 
the informations of the Polish refugees living in Hungary and other "independent" sources of 
information also clearly referred to the guilt of the NKVD, and so there was no need to prove 
the gulit of the Soviet Union in Hungary again and again - even without a strong anti-
communist climate (like in Poldand). The news of the massacre acted as an "alarm", as a 
wrong omen in Hungary, and this explains, why could it turn to a symbol in our country as 
well, to a symbol of mass murder, that remained in use even when it was already officially 
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forbidden to mention, even when the Polish tragedy already seemed to be so far away in the 
past - just like Auschwitiz (symbolizing German war crimes) or the Don-bend (symbolizing 
the miseries of Hungarian soldiers). Besides the differences between the Hungarian and Polish 
mass media and public opinion we will reveal some similarities as well. In general we can 
say, that both the Hungarian and the Polish public opinion was unwilling to accept the 
statements of the German and Soviet propaganda, and tried to gain authentic information on 
their own. It became clear very quickly for everyone in the two countries that only the Soviet 
Union can be blamed for the mass murder of the Polish officers, and as the war front got 
closer and closer to the borders, the so called Katyń-sydrom appeared both in Poland and in 
Hungary. And after the war the people (both Hungarians and Poles) taking part in the 
exhumation works of Katyń had to face charges of serving Germans - some of them managed 
to avoid this fate (as Ferenc Orsós did by fleeing to Germany), and some of them (like the 
Polish Jan Zygmunt Robel) could not. In general we can clearly state, that despite the 
fluctuating and then fading out interest of the Hungarian press and despite the "distance" of 
the tragedy to the Hungarian public opinion, Katyń meant for Hungarians far more than a 
rumor or a "war-sensation", and its Hungarian aspects (for example the findings and fate of 
Ferenc Orsós) could maintain interest in the topic for a long time - and the horrors of the 
Katyń graves not only shocked and disgusted the public opinion, but made the whole case to a 
symbol of the Soviet Union's guilt in Hungary as well.  
3. We reviewed the postwar Polish reception history of the case divided into two main 
chapters, focusing fist on the stalinist Bierut-system, then on the People's Republic of Poland 
(1956-1989). As a result of our investigation we received answers for several questions, for 
example for the following ones: what kind of role played the Katyń-propaganda of the Soviet 
Union and the Polish communists in this period of time, in what kind of forms had the 
censorship appeared besides this, and how did the Polish people react to these lies and 
methods? We have even listed what kind of groups of the basically anti-Soviet Polish society 
could protest against the Katyń lie forced upon them, and what kind of punishment, retaliation 
they had to face. We have stated that in opposite to the widespreadly appearing misbelief, in 
the first decade of the communist led Poland the system of censorship and opression 
regarding the topic of Katyń was still not consistent, namely the state power was willing to 
mention and deal with the Katyń case in connection with foreign events (Nuremberg, 
Madden-committee)  just to try proving his own "right" - of course only as far as it could 
fulfill this task, not going too deeply in the topic. We could see that all initiatives reaching for 
more were immediately shut down, banned, even if it did in fact came from the ranks of the 
 8 
communist party. The anti-commmunist behaviour of the Polish public opinion and the fact 
that Katyń remained a highly "sensitive" topic for the Polish communists and the Soviets as 
well made the politics to bury the topic underneath the veil of censorship again and again. 
And after it turned out that the counterpropaganda against the foreign "accusations" is not 
only ineffective, but even increases the internal tensions of the society, after 1956 the 
leadership of the communist party decided to not even mention the case once again, even if 
they had a chance to unveil the truth twice - once moreover recommended by Soviet 
authorities. 
4. Regarding the Hungarian reception, echoes and effects of the massacre between 1945-1956 
we have also investigatied its influence on the official press, politics and public opinion. 
Among other things we were looking for answer for the following questions: for how long 
was the German version of the Katyń case present in the Hungarian public opinion after the 
war, and how communists tried to take action againt the "anti-Soviet accusations". As to this 
we could state that the memory of the Soviet mass murder was still present and "alive" in the 
Hungarian public opinion - even despite the fact that the Hungarian communists did not tried 
to explain and defend their point of view, but on the contrary they decided to ban the whole 
topic. As it turned out of the recollections, the case was not only kept in mind because of its 
anti-Soviet meaning or because of the shock evoked by the German propaganda, but it 
remained a mean of expressing solidarity towards the Poles for many people. But we can 
consider as a fact however, that in Hungary the topic was not anyomre of such importance as 
in Poland - simply because the Hungarian society was not affected. So as a result of this the 
Hungarian Communist Party was not forced to prove the Soviet Union's innocence in the 
Katyń case, they could only simply remain silent on this matter - and this attitude remained 
dominant in the Hungarian politics for decades - and also in the press, literature and public 
life as well. But it is also important to mention that despite the fact that the memory of Katyń 
did not became a case forging opposition movements, did not became a case of high 
importance, it in fact remained in the memory of the Hungarians, namely as a crime 
committed by the Soviet Union.  
5. As for the reception history of the Katyń case in the People's Republic of Poland after 
1956, we were looking for the answer mainly to the following question: what changes 
happened regarding this issue after the death of Stalin and the revolutionary year of 1956, and 
what events led to Katyń becoming a symbol, and the truth becoming officially accepted. In 
order to get to the answers, we have investigated the history of polish opposition movements, 
their role in the Katyń case, and their reactions to the censorship and lies of the communist 
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party as well. As we could see, the standpoint of the government regarding the Katyń case got 
stuck between two endpoints after 1956: they were unwilling to unveil the truth, but they were 
not able to ban the topic and successfully silence the opposition as well. As a result of this, the 
issue lived a "double life" later: the government officially censored the topic, and the 
underground movements broke the censorship by publishing their own opinion, the truth. The 
communist leaders of Poland have chosen the "third way", that proved to be the worst option 
in terms of conservating their leading role: as they could neither publish the truth, nor 
successfully ban the topic, they had to face continuus conflicts, and these continuusly 
weakened their power - more drastically than any confession of the truth. All in all we can 
say, that Katyń became such an effective symbol in this period of time, that managed to bring 
the protesters together to a strong, common unity. Making the government to confess the truth 
would have been certainly much more difficult without this powerful unity supported by the 
majority of the Polish society. Katyń not only played a unifying role, but the struggle with the 
Katyń lie also enforced hope in getting to the common goal, since the topic raised the interest 
of more and more people, and parallel to this, as it became widespreadly known and 
discussed, it became more and more free to speak about as well - as to the point when it 
became completely free to speak about by cancelling censorship and allowing researches. The 
progress of this process was very promising for everyone who tried to achive suverenity, and 
who tried to change the system. To summarize the above mentioned facts, we found out that 
the Katyń issue served as a catalyst of resistance movements, and at the same time it had a 
postive effect on the unveiling of the truth as well, since the truth about Katyń became more 
and more discussed and accepted as well trough this process. Katyń filled an important role in 
the thinking og the opposition in the People's Republic of Poland - for various (historical, 
political, religious and even personal) reasons and it became a cohesive factor and catalyst of 
movements that finally achieved the situation when the communist party just could not 
maintain the system of lies and oppession anymore. 
6. In the next big chapter we investigated the Hungarian memory of the Katyń massacre 
between 1956-1989 by using the sources of literature, the Hungarian emigration, the public 
opinion and state security organisations. We also found out how the Polish opposition 
movements influenced the Hungarian opposition, first of all in relation to samizdat literature. 
Finally we ended our investigation with presenting how the topic in Hungary became freely 
researchable and discussable. In conclusion we can say, that the fact of the Katyń massacre 
remained in the common memory of the Hungarians even under the Kádár-era - despite that it 
was far not as so popular and well known as in Poland. We could see that with the help of 
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Polish underground organisations Hungarian intellectuals managed to release a translated 
book of "Western" origins about Katyń. Although the Hungarian "official history" and 
political literature lied about the issue, the tragedy of Polish officers did not get forgotten in 
Hungary, neither. However it is true in fact, that it obviously did not became as important as 
in Poland. It only remained in the collective memory without playing a unifying role, without 
becoming a symbol that brings thousands of people together against the untruthful regime. As 
we could see, the "liberation" of the Katyń topic in Hungary took place only in 1989, the year 
of transition. 
7. To summarize the results of our work we can say, that after the discovery of the Katyń 
graves in 1943, the horrific tragedy of the Polish officers became a mean of propaganda in the 
eyes of the superpowers that ruled both countries - and they even tried to change public 
opinion as well - in Poland and in Hungary, too. It is clear, that the mass murder of Polish 
officers remained a painful memory mailny in the common sense of the Polish society, and so 
the motivation of the Hungarian public opinon is hard to compare to that. Yet it is 
unquestionable as well, that the Hungarian public opinion was aware of the importance of the 
Katyń case and the guilt of the Soviet Union, too. However (because of their relations to the 
tragedy) the Poles were the most committed and resolute defenders of the truth about Katyń, 
and they were the ones who finally achieved free discussion of the issue, we should not forget 
about the fact, that lot of Hungarians stood up for the truth of the Polish people - some 
because of their anti-Soviet convictions, some because of their sympathy to Poles, and some 
simply because of their sense of justice.  So (besides its Hungarian aspects and the influence 
of the Polish opposition movements) that is why the topic of the Katyń massacre could remain 
in the common memory of the Hungarian public opinion as well. 
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